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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Is an instant of abuse that occurred over three years to prior to trial, but which the trial 
court determined would "never happen again" a sufficiently "compelling circumstance" to justify 
disturbing an existing custody arrangement where the child has done well? 
ISSUE NO. 2 
Is the "opportunity to travel" a sufficiently compelling circumstance to justify disturbing 
an existing custody arrangement where the parties' minor child has done well? 
Standard of Review: 
These issues present questions of fact. An appellate court reviews the trial court's 
findings of fact, with regard to custody, using a clearly erroneous standard. Tucker v. Tucker, 
910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996). However, to ensure that a court acted within its discretion, the facts 
and reasons for the court's decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and 
conclusions. Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1993). The findings must be 
sufficiently detailed to ensure that the trial court's discretionary determination was rationally 
based. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-903 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
l.The parties to this proceeding were divorced in June of 1995. At that time, the parties 
were awarded joint custody of their minor child and the physical custody of the child was 
divided between the parties on a schedule such that each party would have the child with that 
parent, as primary custodial parent, for a continuous 6 month period of time. (Record, hereinafter 
"R", at 33) The child, who had been born on May 7, 1992, (R at 24) would have started public 
education at the kindergarten level in the fall of 1997. (R at 40) 
2. On or about October 23, 1996, Defendant filed a Verified Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce, wherein Defendant alleged that the Plaintiff had neglected the child's medical care and 
did not properly clothe the child when in her care. Defendant also alleged that his circumstances 
had substantially changed since the Decree had been entered. He claimed that he had remarried 
and the home he and his spouse were providing for the child and the child's step siblings was an 
improvement over the existing custody arrangement such that a change from equal physical 
custody to primary care of the child being awarded to the Defendant was in the child's best 
interest. Defendant also alleged that, because of the distance between the parties' respective 
residences and the child's entry into the public school system within the next year a need existed 
to modify the then existing custody order. (R at 39-44) 
3. On or about December 5, 1996, Plaintiff answered the petition and filed a counter 
petition for custody. (R at 48-57) Both parties acknowledged that the existing order was 
inappropriate and needed to be changed. 
4. On December 30, 1996, the Defendant filed a Motion for Temporary Custody. (R at 
63) Prior to a hearing scheduled for January 24, 1997, the parties agreed that the child would 
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remain with the Defendant until the end of February, 1997, and that the parties would begin a 
custody evaluation, to be conducted by V Gerald Thamert, L C S W The parties agreed that the 
custody evaluation should be completed by June 1, 1997, and that a heanng on the parties' 
respective Petitions to Modify would be held on or pnor to the 15th of July 1997 (R at 131-133) 
5 On Defendant's Motion the tnal, which had been scheduled for July 10, 1997, was 
continued until August 25, 1997 (R at 224) 
6 On or about August 18, 1997, the parties agreed to continue the tnal from the August 
25, 1997 date because the Plaintiff, who was at that time residing m Germany with her husband, 
had injured her foot and was unable to travel (R at 238-239) Trial was rescheduled until 
November 10, 1997, and that date was changed, on the Court's own motion, to January 22, 1998 
(R at 245) 
7 V Gerald Thamert, the expert commissioned to complete the custody evaluation had 
submitted a report to the Court and to the parties on July 1, 1997, in which he had recommended 
that the parties be awarded joint legal custody with the Plaintiff awarded primary physical 
custody throughout the school year In a letter dated December 19, 1997, Mr Thamert had 
indicated that would not be finished updating the custody evaluation in time for the January 22, 
1998 tnal (R at 252-253) He recommended that the child remain with the Defendant until tnal 
could be rescheduled (R at 253) During a telephone conference call with the tnal court in which 
this information was shared with the tnal court, the Plaintiff requested a continuance of the tnal 
(R at 252) Consistent with Plaintiffs request and Mr Thamert's recommendation, the tnal was 
continued until Apnl 16, 1998 and Defendant was awarded temporary custody (R at 252-254) 
8 Plaintiff moved to continue the Apnl 16, 1998 trial (R at 296, 307-309) That motion 
was granted in part On Apnl 16 1998, Mr Thamert testified and recommended that in light of 
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circumstances that had occurred since the original report, primary custody be awarded to the 
Defendant. (T at 119) The trial was scheduled to be completed on August 3 and 4, 1998, so that 
Plaintiff could cross examine Mr. Thamert and present evidence on her behalf. (Transcript of 
trial, hereinafter "T", at 7) 
9. Trial was completed on August 3 and 4, 1998 and the trial court awarded custody to 
the Plaintiff, despite the custody evaluator's recommendation that the child remain with the 
Defendant. 
10. Disagreement between the parties regarding the form of the trial court's findings and 
order were finally resolved and an Order was entered on June 22, 1999. (R at 389) This appeal 
follows. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Evidence had been presented at trial with regard to the factors an evaluator must 
consider in making a recommendation concerning custody of a minor child. 
2. In making its factual findings, the trial court ruled that, although both parties lacked in 
moral character and moral stability when the parties' child was conceived, they now showed 
substantial emotional stability. (T. at 867) The trial court made no finding as to which of the 
parties would be more favored as custodial parent based on moral character or emotional 
stability. 
3. The Court did not make any findings with reference to the child's preference 
concerning permanent custody. 
4. The trial court determined that the following factors identified in Rule 4-903, of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, did not favor either party, but that the evidence was, as the 
trial court stated: "evenly based": 
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a) the benefit of keeping siblings together; (T. at 808) 
b) the relative strength of the child's bond with one or both of the prospective 
custodian; (T. at 869) 
c) the duration and depth of desire for custody; (T. at 869) 
d) The ability to personal rather than surrogate care; (T. at 869) 
e) Significant impairment of ability to function as a parent through drug abuse, 
excessive drinking or other causes; (T. at 869-870) 
f) reasons for having relinquished custody in the past; (T. at 870) 
g) religious compatibility; (T. at 870) 
h) kinship; (T. at 870) and 
i) financial condition. (T. at 871) 
5. Although the evidence was conflicting on this issue, the trial court found that the 
Plaintiff and the parties' minor child had been subjected to abuse at the hands of the Defendant 
in May of 1995. However, the trial court also found that "It is not abuse that would ever happen 
again. That's the kind of progress that these parties have made. I am certain and convinced as of 
today's date, that Mr. Tiller would never raise his hand to this child in that fashion ever again. 
He is a different man now than he was back then,..." (T. at 871). 
6. As "other factors" deemed important by the .. .court" the trial court also concluded: "I 
believe that it is in Tristan's best interest that he be given the opportunity to travel, that he be 
given the chance to go with his mother to Europe and to see that part of the world. Even as a 
young lad that he will be able to grow." (T. at 872-873). 
7. In his recommendation to the trial court, dated July 1, 1997, V. Gerald Thamert, 
LCSW, recommended that the Plaintiff be awarded the physical care and custody of the parties' 
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minor child throughout the school year with the child to spend the majority of the summer with 
his father. However, at trial, several months later and after the child had been in Defendant's 
home, attending school in the school district where Defendant resides, Mr. Thamert changed that 
recommendation and recommended that the child stay with the Defendant. (T at 119) 
8. In support of his recommendation that Defendant be awarded physical custody, Mr. 
Thamert noted the following: 
a) that a strong bond existed between the child and Defendant's spouse; (T at 
100) 
b) that he had some concerns about the psychological report for Plaintiffs 
husband; (Tat 100-101) 
c) that the child, Tristan's, relationship with his half sister, who lived in St. 
George, Utah, was very close and loving and should continued; (T at 102) 
d) that Defendant's home was a "warm, safe, comfortable environment" for 
Tristan; (T. at 106) 
e) that Tristan is equally attached to his mother, the Plaintiff, and to his father, the 
Defendant; (T. at 107) 
f) that he was "puzzled" that Plaintiff had not visited with Tristan while he had 
been residing in Defendant's home during the pendency of the proceedings; (T. at 110) 
g) that he was concerned that Plaintiff had not contacted the child's school until 
the day prior to trial; (T. at 110) 
h) that Defendant had sacrificed a lot for his son, but that Plaintiff expects 
Defendant to accommodate her; (T. at 117) 
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i) that Tristan would be better off in Defendant's home with Defendant's wife, 
Maggie, being an influence and being able to associate with his half sister and 
stepbrothers; (T. at 119) and 
j) that Tristan should stay in the educational track, at Bloomington Hills 
Elementary, where he was then attending school (T. at 119). 
9. Mr. Thamert also noted that the Defendant's home is quite stable and had been for 
some time whereas Plaintiffs home was an unknown. (T. at 121) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The custody arrangements which existed at the time of the trial, in which the child was 
doing well, should have been disturbed only if the Court found compelling circumstances to 
change those custody arrangements. No such compelling circumstances existed. 
In this instance, the Court found each party to be equally qualified to serve as the 
custodial parent of their minor child except with regard to three factors. With regard to those 
three factors, the Court ignored the most critical one: continuing the stable, existing custody 
arrangement. The trial court erred in ignoring that factor. 
Instead of continuing the existing, stable custody arrangement, the trial court awarded 
custody to the Plaintiff based on an incident of abuse which the trial court found had occurred 
nearly three years prior to trial. In light of the trial court's determination that that abuse would 
never happen again, that factor should not have formed the basis for a custody award to Plaintiff. 
It appears that the trial court, instead of awarding custody based on the child's best interests, 
used the award of custody to punish Defendant for perceived misconduct that had occurred three 
years prior to trial. Custody should not be used to punish either party. A custody award is 
intended to serve the best interests of the child. In light of the Court's finding that the Defendant 
7 
would never act abusively again, it was error for the trial court to award custody based on this 
finding of past abuse. 
It was error for the trial court to award child support based on a new factor, unidentified 
in any of the prior Appellate Court decisions in this state, that the child should be given the 
"opportunity to travel" and that custody with his mother would give him a greater opportunity to 
do so. In essence, the trial court's order would exalt a child's opportunity for adventure over 
stability, a result that is not in a child's best interest. 
Custody should have been awarded to the Defendant, subject to the Plaintiffs right to 
visit, taking into account the distance between the parties' residences. The trial court's order 
should be set aside and an order entered awarding custody to the Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
A. AN ISOLATED INCIDENT OF ABUSE WHICH DOES NOT AFFECT THE ON-
GOING PARENTING ABILITY OF THE DEFENDANT OR HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH 
THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILD IS NOT SUCH A COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCE AS TO 
JUSTIFY DISTURBING THE STABLE CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT EXISTING AT THE 
TIME OF TRIAL IN WHICH THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILD WAS DOING WELL. 
In Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P. 2d 38 (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court identified 
several factors which a trial court should consider in determining a child's best interests prior to 
awarding custody. Several of these factors are related primarily to the child's feelings or special 
needs, and include "the preference of the child; keeping siblings together; the relative strength of 
the child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians; and, in appropriate cases, the 
general interest in continuing previously determined custody arrangements when the child is 
happy and well-adjusted." Id at 41 In Hutchison the Court identified other factors which relate, 
not to the child's feelings or special needs, but, instead, relate primarily to the "prospective 
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custodian's character or status or capacity or willingness to function as parents." Id at 41. Those 
factors, which relate primarily to the party's ability to function as custodial parent, include: 
"moral character and emotional stability; duration and depth of the desire for custody; ability to 
provide personal rather than surrogate care; significant impairment of ability to function as a 
parent through drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other cause; reasons for having relinquished 
custody in the past; religious compatibility with the child; kinship, including, in extraordinary 
circumstances, stepparent status; and financial condition." Id at 41. 
Most of the factors identified in Hutchison had been incorporated into Rule 4-903 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. That rule provides that, in performing a custody 
evaluation, an evaluator must consider and respond to the following factors: 
"(A) the child's preference;' 
(B) The benefit of keeping siblings together; 
(C) The relative strength of the child's bond with one or both of the prospective 
custodians; 
(D) The general interest in continuing previously determined custody arrangements 
where the child is happy and well adjusted." (Rule 4-903, UCJA) 
These factors are essentially identical to those identified as the factors relating primarily 
to the child's feelings or special needs in Hutchison. 
Rule 4-903(3)(e) identifies the factors which the custody evaluator must consider which 
relate to the prospective custodian's character or status or the capacity or willingness to function 
as a parent. These include all of the factors identified in Hutchison as factors relating to the 
prospective custodian's ability to function as a parent except that subsection (ix) identifies a 
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factor not specifically identified in Hutchison. That factor is "evidence of abuse of a subject 
child, another child, or spouse;..." (Rule 4-903(3)(E)(ix)UCJA) 
Child abuse is one of the factors a custody evaluator should consider in completing a 
custody evaluation. Child abuse has also been recognized by appellate courts in this state as a 
factor that should be considered by a trial court in resolving competing claims to custody. (Linam 
v. King, 804 P.2d 1235 at 1239 (Utah App. 1991) 
Child abuse is a factor that the trial court should consider in awarding custody. 
Defendant does not claim the trial court should have ignored allegations of abuse, but, instead, 
maintains that a past incident of abuse, remote in time, should not be the controlling factor in 
determining custody absent evidence and a finding by the trial court that the past incident of 
abuse affects the present ability to function as a parent. As was recognized in In the interest of 
JJ.T. and T.J.T., 877 P.2d 161 (Utah App. 1994), 'The best interests of a child usually cannot be 
determined from a single incident, or even a series of incidents considered in isolation." Id at 
164. 
A parent's moral character has long been considered a relevant factor in determining that 
parent's fitness as a custodial parent. However, appellate courts have acknowledged that moral 
character, in a vacumn, is not a factor that should be given substantial weight. The real focus of 
the inquiry is the impact the moral character has on the ability to function as custodial parent. 
In Shioji v. ShiojU 712 P.2d 1997 (Utah 1985) the non custodial parent had filed a 
Petition to Modify Custody because of the custodial parent's extra marital relationship. The trial 
court had found that the custodial parent's conduct and attitude with respect to that relationship 
had a substantial adverse affect on the children. Id at 199. The trial court found that the custodial 
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parent and the parent's companion were "either unwilling or unable to appreciate the adverse 
impact of their conduct on the children/' Id at 200. 
In analyzing the extra marital sexual relationship and its impact as a factor in determining 
custody, the Supreme Court stated that "a custodial parent's extra marital sexual relationship 
alone is insufficient to justify a change in custody." The Court went on to state: 
" The trial court's findings in this case go far beyond a single finding that [the 
custodial parent] engaged in extra marital intercourse or that she, on occasion, allowed 
her boyfriend to stay overnight. The key to our decision is the court's finding of a 
substantial adverse impact on the children as a result of the [custodial parent's] 
behavior." Wat 200-01. 
The focus with regard to those factors which relate to the prospective custodian's 
character or status or the capacity or willingness to function as parents is not whether a character 
flaw exists. Otherwise, custody awards could be used to inflict punishment for misbehavior. 
That, however, is not the function of custody awards. An award of custody should be based on 
the child's best interests. If misbehavior on the part of a prospective custodial parent has 
occurred, the focus should be on whether the prior incident of misbehavior has a substantial 
adverse impact on the child, in essence, on whether the factor impairs the ability of the parent to 
serve as a custodial parent. 
In the case pending before this court, the trial court did make a factual finding that abuse 
had occurred in May of 1995, over three years prior to the final day of the trial. Although 
Defendant denied the claim of abuse, for purposes of appeal, there is evidence to support that 
finding. However, a finding of abuse does not end the inquiry. A finding of abuse, just as would 
a finding of immoral conduct or emotional instability in the past, would only be relevant in the 
event the past incident of abuse had a present adverse impact on the parent/child relationship. 
No such finding was made in this case. To the contrary, the trial court specifically found that the 
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abuse would never happen again. The trial court found: "It is not abuse that would ever happen 
again. The trial court is certain and convinced that as of the date of the trial, Defendant would 
never raise his hand t[o] this child in that fashion ever again.(R at 385) 
Although what may be perceived as inappropriate conduct on the part of a parent is a 
factor that may be considered in awarding custody, the weight to be given that factor is relatively 
unimportant in the absence of any indication that the inappropriate conduct would impact the 
child. 
In Hudema v. Carpenter P.2d 380 UAR 3 (Utah App. 1999) the trial court found 
that a comparison of the parties' moral character favored awarding custody to the father. The 
Court of Appeals discussed religious compatability and moral character as factors in the custody 
dispute. The Court concluded that religious incompatibility is only relevant if there is a negative 
impact on the child's welfare. Id at 7 Moral character "may be relevant" but only "to the extent 
[the moral character] affects the children's best interests." Id at 7. When compared to the need 
for maintaining stability, moral character and religious incompatibility are relatively unimportant 
and cannot override the interest in preserving stability. 
In Layton v. Layton, an unpublished opinion from the Mississippi Court of Appeals, No. 
90-CA-00936 CO A, 1998 Miss. App. Lexis 574, (Miss. App. 1998), the noncustodial parent 
sought to modify a custody award because his former wife, the custodial parent, has permitted 
her present spouse to inflict corporal punishment on the parties' child. The trial court granted the 
petition and transferred custody. In reviewing that decision, the appellate court wisely concluded 
that "[a]n isolated incident should not be the impetus for finding a material change in 
circumstances... The chancellor must determine whether the overall circumstances in which the 
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child lives have materially changed and if they are likely to remain that way for the foreseeable 
future." Id 
In Touchstone v. Touchstone, 682 So.2d 374 (Miss. 1996) the non custodial parent cited 
several events which he claimed demonstrated that custody should be changed. In responding to 
that claim, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that "In cases where the argument for a change 
in custody is built upon specific isolated incidents, we have found that 'an isolated incident, e.g., 
an unwarranted striking of a child, does not in and of itself justify a change of 
custody'...[citations omitted]. Rather, 'in situations that appear to be isolated incidents rather 
than the normal rule, this Court has stated that is must be the overall circumstances in which a 
child lives, likely to remain unchanged in the foreseeable future and adversely impacting a child, 
to warrant a charge of custody." Id at 378. 
In this case the trial court erred when it awarded custody to the Plaintiff solely because of 
an isolated incident of abuse by Defendant that had occurred three years prior to trial. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED CUSTODY TO DEFENDANT 
IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE THEN EXISTING STABLE ENVIRONMENT ENJOYED 
BY THE CHILD IN THE DEFENDANT'S HOME. 
Factors considered by trial courts in determining custody awards are of varying 
significance, depending upon the circumstances of each case. However, stability, where the 
child is thriving, has always been a factor to be given substantial weight. 
In Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, (Utah 1989) the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged 
the importance of stability in accessing the best interests of a child. In discussing the stability 
factor, the Court stated that: "a lengthy custody arrangement in which a child has thrived ought 
rarely, if at all, to be disturbed, and then only if the circumstances are compelling." Id at 604 
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The Court went on to state: 
"The stability with which the law is primarily concerned is not the stability of the 
legal custody arrangement as such, but rather the stability that makes possible the 
psychological and emotional security that underlies a child's well-developed sense of 
self-worth and self-confidence." Id at 604 
In general, the Elmer case stands for the following: 
"[T]he trial court should give stability and continuity the weight that is 
appropriate in light of the duration of the existing custodial relationship and the general 
welfare of the child. The findings of fact should reflect that the court considered stability 
as a factor in the custody decision and the weight the court accorded it." Id at 605. 
In this particular instance, the trial court did not address the issue of stability. 
However, in his testimony the custody evaluator did. Mr. Thamert recommended that the child 
stay with his father, the Defendant, in the home in which he had been living while these 
proceeding were pending, because of the stability the Defendant had been and was able to 
continue to provide. 
The child had been living in the Defendant's home when the proceedings 
commenced, in late 1996, and, but for a brief visit with his mother in Virginia during early 1997, 
and during the summer of 1998, had lived with his father, stepmother and stepbrothers and 
sisters, and in the same community as his half sister, until August of 1998. The evidence before 
the Court was that the child had an excellent relationship with his older stepbrother, Robbie, and 
that he was doing well in the present environment. The stability and continuity of that 
relationship should have been preserved in the absence of compelling circumstances. 
This case is comparable to Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988), in which the child 
lived with one party for approximately one year prior to trial. In Davis, as in this case, the child 
lived with his father while his mother was settling her affairs. In Davis, the trial court concluded, 
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as a factor in awarding custody to the father that "[the father] had been J.Z's primary caregiver 
for over a year and had provided a very stable environment" Id at 648. 
No compelling circumstances existed to remove these parties' child from the stable home 
the Defendant was providing at the time of trial. In fact, the only circumstances which suggested 
that custody should be awarded to the Plaintiff were an incident of abuse found to have occurred 
more than three years prior to the date of trial, which the Court was convinced would never 
happen again, and the Court's apparent preference for European travel over stability and 
continuity. 
All of the present circumstances of the parties were considered to be on an equal footing 
as the same related to the issue of custody, except the "opportunity to travel." Even the abuse 
issued was not considered to be a present problem since the trial court acknowledged that both 
parties had change so much that the trial court was convinced that the defendant would not injure 
the child any more than the Plaintiff would fall asleep while the child was wandering around the 
swimming pool. (T at 871-872). The only significant difference between the parties' 
circumstances other than the fact that the child had been in the defendant's home for sucn a 
lengthy period of time, was the Court's finding that, by awarding the Plaintiff custody, the child 
would have an opportunity to travel. In this context, the issue appears to be whether the 
"opportunity to travel" is a sufficiently compelling circumstance to justify disturbing the existing 
stable custody arrangement. 
In essence, the trial court determined that the opportunity to move about and to see new 
things, an opportunity certainly present in the most unstable of custody arrangements, was a 
factor that justified removing the child from the stable environment in the Defendant's home 
where the child was doing well. In making that finding the trial court erred. Adventure, in 
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essence, instability, as interesting as it may be, is not more critical to a child's development than 
stability in a nurturing home and neighborhood. 
The opportunity to travel is certainly a factor a trial court may consider. (See Rule 4-
903(3)(F) U.C.J.A.) However, the opportunity to travel would also be present if the Plaintiff 
were to take advantage of the opportunities claimed available to her to have the child come to see 
her in Europe while she lived there with her husband. There was no evidence presented to the 
trial court that would suggest that this ''opportunity to travel" would be greater were the child to 
spend the school year with his father, the Defendant, and most of the summer with the Plaintiff 
in Europe. 
It certainly would not be necessary for the child to reside in Europe with his mother to 
take advantage of the opportunities to travel. In fact, the trial court specifically found that is 
would be a good idea for the Defendant to come visit with the child in Europe so that he and his 
father could see Europe together, parts the Plaintiff and her husband might not be able to see 
because of his military requirements. (T at 875). However, there was no suggestion in the 
evidence that the Plaintiff could not have taken the child for visitation, during the summer 
vacation from school, and visited those same parts of Europe with the child while still preserving 
the continuity and stability that had existed in his father's home during the school year. 
Mr. Thamert recommended that the Tristan stay with his father in Washington County. 
He acknowledged, that, were the Defendant the one providing the unstable environment and his 
mother the person remaining in Washington County, the child should stay with the mother. This 
was a very close case. To the evaluator the critical factor appeared to be avoiding disruption to 
the child's stability. This was not only the critical factor but should have been the controlling 
factor. 
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While with the Defendant the child was subject to the influence of his stepmother, the 
person who apparently had the most positive influence on the child of all the persons involved in 
this proceeding, and he was in an exceptional school system in Bloomington Hills where the 
evaluator was of the opinion he would thrive. The trial court failed to afford the proper weight to 
the stability factor in determining which of these parties should have custody of their minor 
child. 
Acknowledging that this was a close case, the trial court ruled that the Plaintiff should 
have custody, not because of any deficit in the Defendant's parenting ability, but because of an 
event that occurred nearly three years ago which the Court was convinced would not occur again, 
and because the Court concluded that the opportunity to travel would be available were the child 
to be in his mother's home, without offering any explanation as to why that same opportunity to 
travel would not also be present, during the summertime, when the child was not in school, 
during visits with his mother in Europe where she intended to live with her husband. 
The trial court erred. The continuity and stability which the child had been enjoying 
should have continued. There was no function related factor that justified removing the child 
from the home he had known for almost two years and removing him from that home to face an 
uncertain future with his mother in Europe. The trial court's decision awarding custody to the 
Plaintiff should be reversed and an order entered awarding custody of the parties' minor child to 
the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly found each party to be equally qualified to serve as the custodial 
parent of their minor child when considering nearly all of the factors required to be considered in 
a custody evaluation. With regard to three factors not considered equal, the Court ignored the 
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most critical one, continuing the existing stable arrangement, incorrectly emphasized an incident 
that was not relevant to the child's best interests and focused on a new factor that, in essence, 
exalts instability over stability. The trial court erred. 
Instead of continuing the existing stable custody arrangement, the trial court awarded 
custody to the Plaintiff based on an incident of abuse which the court found had occurred nearly 
three years prior to trial. In light of the trial court's determination that that abuse would never 
happen again, the only basis on which the trial court could have reached an award of custody, 
based on that factor, would have been to punish the Defendant for that misconduct. Custody, 
however, should not be used to punish a party. A custody award is intended to serve the best 
interests of the child. In light of the Court's finding that the Defendant would never act 
abusively again, it was error for the trial court to award custody based on this finding of past 
abuse. 
Finally, it was error for the trial court to award child support based on a new factor, 
unidentified in any of the prior Appellate Court decisions in this state, that the child should be 
given the "opportunity to travel" and that custody with his mother would give him a greater 
opportunity to do that, in essence, placing more weight on adventure than stability for the child. 
The stability in Defendant's home that had existed during the two years this matter was 
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pending should have continued for the parties' minor child. The decision of the trial court 
should be reversed and custody awarded to Defendant 
DATED this is day of _ 1999. 
/
G. Micha* 
of and foy 
/
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I, G. Michael Westfall, certify that on , 1999,1 served two copies of the attached 
Brief of Appellant upon R. Clayton Huntsman, the counsel for the Appellee in this matter, by 
mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
R. Clayton Huntsman 
352 East Riverside Drive, Ste. A-3 
St. George, Utah 84790 
G. Michael Westfall, Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DESIREE 
DESIREE 
v. 
TIMOTHY 
ANN CUMMINS, fka 
ANN TILLER, 
Plaintiff, 
W. TILLER, 
Defendant, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 954500159 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter came before the Court on the 16th of April, 
1998, the 3rd and 4th days of August, 1998, and the 10th day of 
August, 1998, before the Honorable James L. Shumate. The Plaintiff 
was present and represented by counsel, Ronald L. Read, of Hughes 
& Read, currently Hughes & Associates. The Defendant was presented 
and represented by counsel, G, Michael Westfall, of Gallian, 
Westfall, Wilcox & Wright. The Court received and heard evidence, 
and being fully advised in the premises, makes and enters its, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A decree of divorce was entered on or about June 26, 
1995, with the parties being awarded the joint custody of the minor 
child and the physical custody of the child being split and divided 
between the parties every six months. 
2. Defendant filed a Verified Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce on or about October 23, 1996, wherein Defendant alleged 
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abuse and neglect of the minor child. 
3. Plaintiff answered said petition and filed a counter 
petition for custody on or about December 5, 1996. 
4. A home study was conducted by Karen Asaro in 
Virginia and Gerald Thamert in Utah. 
5* The Defendant has paid $906.00 of medical expenses 
for and on behalf of the parties' minor child. Plaintiff shall 
reimburse the Defendant one-half of said medical expenses, $453.00, 
and the Defendant shall be awarded a judgment in that amount. 
6. The Defendant has paid $1,226.00 of day care 
expenses for and on behalf of the parties' minor child. Plaintiff 
shall reimburse the Defendant one-half of said day care expenses, 
$613.00, and the Defendant shall be awarded a judgment in that 
amount. 
7. The parties were ordered to each pay one-half of the 
cost of the home study, including the home study conducted by Mr. 
Thamert in the State of Utah and the home study conducted by Ms. 
Asaro in the State of Virginia. The total cost of both home 
studies is $5,966.00. To the date of trial, the Plaintiff has paid 
$1,158.00 and the Defendant has paid $2,208.00. 
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8. With regard to custody of the parties' minor son, 
the Court finds as follows: 
a. Moral character: Neither party exhibited moral 
character in 1992 when the parties' minor child was conceived. 
Since that time, Mr. Tiller received a conviction related to the 
issuance of bad checks. Both parties have made substantial 
improvements as far as emotional security and the Court is 
encouraged by the Defendant's marriage. 
b. Keeping siblings together: The minor child 
does not have siblings, but does have a half-sister, the issue of 
the Defendant and his first wife. The Plaintiff is expecting a 
child in September of 1998. Therefore, this factor is equal. 
c. Relative strength of bond: Both parties have 
a bond with the child which is equal in strength, as set forth in 
the home study and as found by this Court. Therefore, this factor 
is equal. 
d. Duration and depth of desire for custody: Mr. 
Thamert questioned the depth of the Plaintiff's desire for custody 
based upon a lack of contact during these proceedings. However, 
the court finds that the Plaintiff has a deep and continuing desire 
for custody of the parties' minor child. Therefore, this factor is 
equal. 
e. Personal, not surrogate care: The evidence 
indicated that the Defendant has been able to arrange his work 
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schedule to provide personal care for the parties' minor child. 
The Plaintiff is not currently employed and is having a child in 
the near future- The evidence indicated that she too would be able 
to provide personal care for the parties' minor child. Therefore, 
this factor is equal. 
f. Impairment: Neither party has an impairment 
which would limit their ability to provide the necessary care for 
the parties' minor child. Any possible impairment would be the 
hostility and resentment shown through these proceedings one to the 
other. Therefore, this factor is equal. 
g. Reason relinquish custody in past: No evidence 
was brought before the Court that would harm either party on this 
factor. Therefore, this factor is equal. 
h. Religious compatibility: The child and both 
parties share the same religious affiliation. Therefore, this 
factor is equal. 
i. Kinship: Both parties have family, including 
grandparents, that have been a part of the parties' minor child's 
life. Therefore, this factor is equal. 
j. Financial: Both parties have adequate 
resources as shown by the evidence and found by the home studies in 
order to provide the care and needs of the parties' minor son. 
Therefore, this factor is equal. 
k. Past abuse: This is the factor that the Court 
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finds which tips the scales in favor of awarding custody to the 
Plaintiff. The Court finds by compelling evidence that there was 
past abuse to both the Plaintiff and the parties' minor son at the 
hands of the Defendant. The Court finds this factor in favor of 
the Plaintiff, despite the conflicting testimony of the parties, 
due to the clarity of the testimony regarding the events provided 
by the Plaintiff and the close proximity of those events to 
Plaintiff's filing for a Protective Order. It is not abuse that 
would ever happen again. The Court is certain and convinced that, 
as of the date of trial, Defendant would never raise his hand t 
this child in that fashion ever again. 
Therefore, the Court finds that it is in the best 
interest of the parties' minor child that the Plaintiff have the 
care custody and control of the parties' minor child. 
9. The Defendant is entitled to reasonable visitation. 
At this time, visitation shall be nine (9) weeks during the summer, 
commencing as soon as school ends. The costs of the transportation 
for summer visitation shall be equally shared by the parties. The 
Defendant is also entitled to one (1) week of visitation during 
Easter, and one (1) week of visitation during Christmas; however, 
Defendant shall be responsible for the transportation costs. The 
Defendant shall also be entitled to visitation in Germany while the 
Plaintiff is residing there. The parties are to continue the 
telephone visitation by the Plaintiff calling the Defendant's 
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residence on Wednesdays and the Defendant calling the Plaintiff's 
residence on Sundays. 
Visitation is subject to change by simple motion and not 
by petition, once Tristan is no longer living in Germany with his 
mother, for the following reasons: 
a. The Court finds that it is in the best interest 
of Tristan to have the opportunity to travel and go with his mother 
to Europe and see that part of the world even as a young lad. 
b. As he gets older and as his father grows and 
circumstances change and alter, then the visitation schedule and 
Tristan's school schedule may accommodate differing times for 
visitation. 
c. The parents are so clearly balanced in their 
ability to be good parents. The Court does not want anything to 
interfere with Tristan's understanding of the man that his father 
is and the fact that his father is growing and getting to be a 
better man every day just like his mother is getting to be a better 
mom every day. 
10. The Defendant shall pay child support to the 
Plaintiff in an amount of $282.56. Child support is based upon the 
Defendant's gross monthly income of $2,250.00 and the Plaintiff's 
imputed gross monthly income of $1,118.00, The Defendant is 
entitled to a credit against the child support in an amount of 
$1,920.00 for child support arrears. Defendant may also use the 
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child care, medical and home study judgments as a credit against 
child support owed to the Plaintiff. 
11. Child support shall be reduced by 50% for time 
periods during which the parties' minor child is with the 
noncustodial parent for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days, 
pursuant to §78-45-7.11, Utah Code Annotated. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff shall reimburse Defendant one-half of the 
medical expenses as set forth in the above Findings of Fact. 
Defendant is further awarded a judgment against the Plaintiff in 
the amount of $453.00 for the said medical expenses. 
2. Plaintiff shall reimburse Defendant one-half of the 
day care expenses as set forth in the above Findings of Fact. 
Defendant is further awarded a judgment against the Plaintiff in 
the amount of $613.00 for the said day care expenses. 
3. The parties shall each pay one-half of the cost for 
the home studies conducted by both Mr. Thamert and Ms. Asaro as 
ordered by the order by the Court and as set forth in the above 
Findings of Fact. 
4. It is in the best interest of the parties' minor 
child that the Plaintiff be awarded the care custody and control of 
the parties' minor child based upon the factors set forth in the 
above Findings of Fact. 
5. Defendant is entitled to reasonable visitation as 
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set forth in the above Findings of Fact. 
6. Visitation is subject to. adjustment by motion and 
not by petition, once Tristan is no longer living in Germany with 
his mother. 
7. The Defendant shall pay child support to the 
Plaintiff in an amount of $282.56, based upon Defendant's gross 
monthly income of $2,250.00 and the Plaintiff's imputed gross 
monthly income of $1,118.00. The Defendant is entitled to a credit 
against the child support in an amount of $1,920.00 for child 
support arrears and may also use the child care, medical and home 
study judgments as a credit against child support owed to the 
Plaintiff. 
8. Child support shall be reduced by 50% for time 
periods during which the parties' minor child is with the 
noncustodial parent for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days, 
pursuant to §78-45-7.11, Utah Code Annotated. 
Suh^l^A f DATED this 2 ( day of 1/1/^7 / 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
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State Department of Bureau of Criminal Investigations 
Report on himself or his wife Margaret. 
Now, has that been provided? 
A. That has. 
Q. Okay. Any concerns about that? 
A. Well, it's a concern if his criminal behavior 
continued. But it has not that I'm aware of. 
Q. Was the criminal behavior a bad check or 
something like that? 
A. Uh-huh. Bad checks and — 
Q. Arrest for a bad check? 
A. Uh-huh. There were, I believe, some abuse 
charges too. 
Q. Any convictions? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. All right. You talk about identifying 
information in the report, and you address Tristen's 
relationship with his stepbrother Robbie. 
That would be Maggie's son? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Robbie Park; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. They have a pretty good relationship? 
A. I think they have an excellent one. 
Q. Okay. And that was in 1997, and at that time 
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and you've observed them since then; is that correct? 
A. I have. 
Q. Okay. And you're still convinced that they have 
an excellent relationship? 
A. It continues, yes. 
Q. Okay. You make an interesting comment in your 
report. You indicate that Tristen said if he were hurt 
while at his baby-sitter, of all the adults, who would he 
prefer to have help him, and he said Maggie? 
k. Yes. 
Q. There seems to be a pretty strong bond there in 
relationship between him and his stepmother; is that 
correct? 
A. I believe there is. 
Q. In fact, you — you had indicated at one point 
in your report, that you held requested a custody — a 
psychological evaluation of John Cummins, the — Desiree's 
current husband, and hadn't received one. 
But you have since received one; is that 
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
concerns? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, it is. 
And does that — 
Yes. 
And why is that? 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
101 
A. Because the psychological — the psychologist 
who reviewed it indicated that there were some areas that 
would potentially be problems in the future concerning 
depression and anger• 
Q. That's Mr. Cummins' report? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't have the benefit of that when you 
wrote this initial evaluation, did you? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Okay. And, in fact, you had made a comment to 
me — and I'm going to ask about that — when asked which 
of the four parents in this case appeared to be the most — 
the better parent, you had answered to me and told me who? 
A. Maggie. Or Margaret Tiller. 
Q. Okay. And she appears to have the most stable 
psychological profile? 
A. And she has the — I would say the best 
references. 
Q. The best references? 
THE COURT: Wouldn't you also say that she has 
the most experience? Her oldest daughter is an adult, 
right? 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q. BY MR. WESTFALL: The relationship between — 
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between Tristen and Ashley •— were you able to observe that 
relationship? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And can you describe that relationship. 
A. It's very close and loving. Tristen is 
protective and concerned about her. 
Q. And is it a good idea for that relationship to 
continue? 
A. It's a great idea for it to continue. 
Q. Okay. And you make a comment — made a comment 
that when Tristen was with his mom, he seemed real 
reserved, but when he's with his dad and with other kids, 
he seemed to come out of himself. 
Now, was that your comment, or was that a 
reference that made that comment to you? 
A. I believe that was a reference that made that 
comment. 
Q. Okay. I wanted to make — clarify that. 
Okay. Now, you had indicated that — that 
Mrs. Cummins had said that she had been Tristen's primary 
caretaker, specifically focusing on the '95, '96 period, 
and that she claimed that Tim only had him for — he was 
always with her except for one time when she had Tim come 
and get Tristen in 1995 for one month and six months during 
and preceding this home study and more recently for a month 
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when Mr. Tiller had his son up until the first part of 
June, for a total time of approximately eight months of his 
five years of life. 
My question is is that a significant — it — if 
that fact were — or is that fact significant to your 
evaluation in this case? 
A. It was initially to my initial recommendation. 
Q, If that were not true, though, would that be 
significant? 
A* Yes. 
Q. And, in fact, if Tim had had Tristen with him 
for a majority of the time since the parties' divorce, 
would that be significant to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Now, you have requested that 
Mrs. Cummins provide a recommended visitation schedule for 
Tristen if she were to obtain custody. 
And she provided you a recommended visitation 
schedule; is that correct? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. And that visitation schedule contemplated that 
Tristen would be — she would be able to fly Tristen back 
for holidays and for summer visitation, is that true? 
A. Yeah. She — she essentially indicated to me 
that there would be no problem with transportation. That 
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he could come and go at ease, 
Q. Okay. And you're aware that Tim — Tristen has 
been with Tim since July of 1997? 
A. Yes. 
Q# And during that period of time, are you aware of 
any instance that Mrs. Cummins had come to Utah to visit 
with Tristen? 
A. No. 
Q. Is it your understanding that she would have 
available a discounted or substantial savings on airfare 
because of her husband's employment? 
A% Well, I understood it to be free. 
Q. Okay. And you're not aware of any instance that 
she has made the effort to come from Germany to visit with 
Tristen? 
A* No. My belief is that she has not. 
Q. Okay. So part of — and isn't it true that part 
of determining whether the proposed visitation schedule 
would be feasible — well, let me — let me back up. 
It's relatively easy to recommend a visitation 
schedule and — to a custody evaluator, isn't it? 
A. It is. 
Q. But as we say, the proof is in the pudding? If 
you have a specific — a period of time to see if that — 
if that visitation scheduLe can be implemented or will be 
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implemented, that would give you an indication of whether 
or not the proposal was really in good faith, isn't it? 
A. Well, whether or not it's in good faith, or 
whether or not in actuality it can really work, and whether 
or not it can — it's going to maintain a relationship that 
I think is already a good one. 
Q. Okay. Now, did you talk to Sheila, Desiree's 
mother, about a recommendation concerning visitation — 
concerning custody? 
A. I don't recall doing that. I — I may have. 
Q. You don't recall her making any recommendation 
to you as to where Tristen ought to — who ought to have 
custody of Tristen? 
A. Well, I could refresh my memory by looking at my 
notes. I don't recall — one does not stand out. 
Q. Okay. Just a minute. 
Would you be able to locate notes just sometime 
prior — just prior to December of 1997, just to refresh 
your recollection on that note — on that point? 
A. So far as Sheila? 
Q. Yes. And I don't remember her last name. 
Sheila Lewis. 
THE COURT: While he's looking for that, 
Mr. Read, your four witnesses — of course your client is 
not living here locally, but your witnesses —- are they 
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i local? 
But there'i 
anyway. 
Q. 
finding it 
A. 
Q. 
apparently 
MR. READ: They are. Other than Sheila Lewis. 
3 not a problem with (Inaudible). She'll be here 
THE COURT: Okay. 
BY MR. WESTFALL: Mr. Thamert, if you're not 
— 
I'm not finding it. 
— I'll come back to that later. Since 
not going to finish this up today, I'll 
back to that later. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
You have observed Tristen in the Tiller 
the present Tiller home? 
A
* 
Q. 
Yes. 
we're 
come 
home — 
And you have observed him in that home since 
your initial evaluation report was completed? 
A. 
Q. 
perception 
positive? 
A. 
There are < 
I have. 
And what is your take, or what is your 
of the — of that home environment? Is 
Is it good for Tristen or — 
that 
It's a warm, safe, comfortable environment. 
a. lot of things going on in the home. A lot 
o f — a lot of action. There are a lot of kids, and the 
parents are taxicab drivers. But I would say overall, 
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there's a sense of calm, order. It doesn't seem to me that 
it's a very reactive home. It seems like they're pretty 
deliberate about how they run things* There's a sense of 
discipline, and it's a loving environment. 
Q. Okay. Now, so if you had any — any concerns — 
in your report, you suggest even back in July that the 
parties have joint physical custody. 
And it appears that that is based primarily on 
your perception of the bonding relationship between the 
child and the parties? 
A. That's partially it. Since then, I've attended 
a seminar in Breckenridge, Colorado, by the American 
Conciliation and Family Courts. And it's reaffirmed my 
belief that primary attachment is — is of extreme 
importance as to where a child is placed. The idea being 
that then you can educate an inadequate parent, if there is 
an inadequate parent, and bring them up to standard and — 
and improve their ability to foster that primary 
attachment. 
In this case, I would say that Tristen is 
equally attached to his mother and his father. I don't 
really find a predominance or a preponderance of either 
parent* And usually in a case like this, I will. But in 
this case, I just don't see it. 
Q. Okay. All right. Let me ask you this, then. 
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You indicate that sometimes you can educate a 
parent that has a bond with a child and — and bring the 
parent's parenting skills up, 
Isn't it also true that you can also observe 
the — if you have a period of time that you can observe 
how the parents react with the children and — the child 
and treat the child in order to determine whether they are 
willing to — to do what it takes to be a quality parent? 
A. One of the things I primarily look at, too, is 
how custody is arranged, how custody visitation is managed, 
and how the parent that may have physical care accommodates 
the other parent or brings the other parent into the 
child's life, I'm not so interested in either of the 
parents' rights as I am the child's right to have access to 
both parents. 
Q. Now — and you're aware that — that there have 
been arrangements made during this period of time for 
Tristen to have frequent telephone contact with his mother 
in Germany, aren't you? 
A. I've been told that,, 
Q. Okay, And it's your understanding that that 
involves Mr. Tiller calling once a week, and Mrs, Cummins 
calling once a week? 
A. That's what I've been told. 
Q. So that Tristen has contact with his mother by 
PAUL G, MCMULLIN 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
109 
phone twice — twice a week? 
A. Yeah. I don't know if that happens or not. 
Q. All right. But you're led to believe that 
that's what — that is what has been planned, at least 
according to what you've been told? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And do you think that's a good idea? 
A. Yes. My suggestion would have been at the 
minimum of at least once every other week. So more weekly 
is better. 
Q. So this is better even than you — than you 
would have recommended? 
A. It is. 
Q. Okay. You — during this period of time from — 
that this matter has been pending, has there been any — 
anything about the mother — Desiree's conduct as it 
relates to the child and activities involving that, that's 
caused you some concern? 
A. That was the reason that I asked for more time. 
I wanted to see if she would make contact with her son.. I 
wanted to see if she would attempt — because she told me 
that flights were free. She could fly any time. And it 
was no problem to get from Germany to St. George, Utah. So 
I — I was looking to see how important it was for her to 
visit, although she didn't get to bring him back. 
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And then I — I — I was looking to see how 
vehement she was, or how strident she was in screaming 
about "Listen. I" — "give me some time in Germany. I 
want to take him to Germany for a visit." I also wanted to 
see how she was about his school. If she would contact the 
school or contact the teacher, or if she was interested 
in — I know kindergarten isn't — we traditionally don't 
look at kindergarten as being awfully important. And — 
but to Tristen, it's — it's big time. And so I would look 
to see if the parents are involved. 
Q. Okay. Now, you've said these are the things 
that you would look at. 
What has happened, if anything, that has caused 
you some concern? 
A. I'm puzzled — and puzzled is putting it 
mildly — that — that Mrs. Cummins has not visited her 
son. I guess I — I put myself in — in that position to 
think I'd do everything that I could if I was on the 
continent to come and see my boy. And then if I had free 
travel — I have had free travel in the past, and — and I 
used it. I — I would be using it. I — I was concerned 
she had not contacted the teacher ever until yesterday. 
And I called the teacher and asked — I — and asked if 
there had been any contact — if the teacher was aware if 
there had been any contact with the principal, And there 
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had not been. 
And those — those things concerned me. And I 
just wondered if — if Tristen goes to Germany with his 
mom, then how is visitation going to go? It hasn't gone 
very well now when mom has to put herself out. I — I just 
don't — she seems too laid back, to me, about it. And 
that's — that's my prospective. She has just not been 
aggressive enough to see her kid. 
Q. Are you aware of whether Tim has interfered with 
any efforts she's made to visit? 
A. Oh, I don't know that Tim has interfered with 
it. I think, in fact, Tim's accommodated it. But I — 
I — you know, I don't know how happy he is to do that. 
Q. Okay. But she recently — when she was going to 
come down — come to court, you're aware that she had asked 
Tim to send Tristen out a few days early to California? 
Fly him to California? 
A. I am. 
Q. And you — are you aware that she wanted Tim to 
fly her out before she even — fly Tristen to California 
before she even arrived? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so that he would be spending time with her 
relatives that Tristen hadn't seen for some time? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And you're aware that Tim didn't think that was 
a good idea and didn't agree to do that? You're aware of 
that, aren't you? 
A. I am. 
Q. But Tim agreed to fly Tristen out so that he'd 
be there when his mom got there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So that she — so that she could spend time with 
him? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Do you think that was a good idea? 
A. I do. I thought — initially when the idea came 
up about sending him out early, I thought "Gee, you know, 
that sounds great. Then he can spend time with his 
grandparents.11 I didn't realize he hadn't had any contact 
with them for at least a year. 
Q. So if he'd had a relationship with them and had 
a good relationship with them and knew them, that might be 
appropriate to send him out early to spend some time with 
them? 
A. That's true. 
Q. But that relationship needs to be developed? 
A. Well, apparently, according to Mr. Tiller's 
report, that Tristen — when *— when Tim offered to send 
him out early to go see his grandpa and grandma, he -- he 
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asked "Who?" 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
that was 
send him 
A. 
anyway. 
Q. 
A. 
come and 
take him 
Q. 
Tim made 
Okay, He asked who it was? 
Yeah. (Inaudible)• 
Okay. So you — do you — do you agree that 
in the — in Tristen's best interest that Tim not 
out to spend time with people he didn't know? 
Well, given that information, it made sense 
Okay. 
Or — or it would have made sense to them to 
get him and acquaint themselves with him and then 
back. That would have been a good idea too. 
Okay. All right. Are you aware of the — that 
— actually made financial arrangements for the 
airfare so that Tristen could fly out — 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
— and spent the time with his mother? 
Yes. 
He advanced the funds for that? 
Yes. 
Now, you're aware that — that Desiree was in 
the states — on the continent, I think as you «— as you 
stated — - on the continent sometime earlier this year, is 
that right? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Do you know how long she was here? 
A. I — my recollection was a week or 10 days. 
Q. Do you know where she was? 
A. In Oklahoma at her grandma's funeral. 
Q. Okay. And does it cause you any concern while 
she was in Oklahoma for 10 days earlier this year, that she 
did not come out and see Tristen? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And why is that? 
A. Again, placing myself in her situation, I would 
have done whatever it took to get here and see him or 
arrange to have him brought to where I was. 
Q. Do you have any concerns about any — anything 
else in terms of Mrs. Cummins' — Desiree's willingness to 
essentially sacrifice for Tristen7s welfare while this case 
has been pending? 
A. Well, I don't — I'm not aware that any support 
has been sent to Mr. Tiller, or that any clothes have been 
sent or •— for Tristen or any materials that he might 
need. I — there's a dispute about what was sent at 
Christmastime, and that there was a bike waiting for 
Tristen I think back in Germany. But — but as far as 
support goes to Mr. Tiller while he has Tristen, I — I 
don't believe there's been much. 
Q. Okay. There was a — a care package or 
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Christmas package sent him in November. 
And you're aware of that, aren't you? 
A. Yes, 
Q. Okay. All right. You've heard Loralee Cuff 
testify today — the day-care provider — 
A. Yes. 
Q, — about her observations of Tristen when he — 
when he came in August — late August of '96? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then that Tim had medical procedures 
performed and helped to clear up some of those problems? 
A. Yes. 
Q, Does that cause you any concern with reference 
to the — to the type of medical care or attention that 
Tristen was getting when he was last with his mother — or 
with his mother just prior to then? 
A. You know, it — it causes me some concern. 
But — but frankly, you know, if one parent — I mean I — 
I was — I'm not aware of the circumstances at the time. 
If one parent gets the procedure done, and the other parent 
is aware of — of the problem, you know, it's kind — it's 
kind of hard to say if it's an indication of one-upmanship, 
or if we're taking care of a kid. 
What concerns me now, too, that you mention that 
is that — that if Mr. Tiller complains that there has not 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
116 
been any medical or government insurance information 
provided to him whereby he can take his son to the doctor 
and have it paid for, so he has to pay out of pocket for 
his son's expenses when as I understand it, the military 
would pay for that, and it — it's just a matter of passing 
on information, it's not a matter of money. 
Q. Okay. All right. There is a — just a second. 
All right. It is — it is, however — you are 
aware, are you not, that Tim does have insurance to cover 
80 percent of the child medical expenses (Inaudible) out of 
pocket? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. You're talking about additional benefits 
that may be available through the military? 
A. Well, if it can be paid 100 percent, why not. 
Q. Okay. Okay. A couple of other things I wanted 
to ask you, Mr. Thamert. 
There is a — a factor that typically the courts 
will look at in not determining — necessarily focusing on 
custody, but focusing on — on child termination 
proceedings. I'm certainly not suggesting that this is a 
termination proceeding, but what I want to talk to you a 
little bit about has to do with the issue of neglect and a 
child's — or a parent's willingness to set aside their own 
interests for the benefits of the child. 
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And have you observed anything in that 
particular area — that is, either parent's willingness to 
sacrifice their own interest for the benefit of the 
child — that you think is — is relevant — has any 
relevance to this — this controversy? 
A, Well, I feel that Mr. Tiller has sacrificed a 
lot for his son, and it's — it's caused him in time, 
attention, and money. I — I think that Mrs. Cummins 
expects Mr. Tiller to accommodate her. And — and actually 
more than accommodate — enable her — for instance, doing 
the thing of financing the ticket. Although that's a small 
thing, I think it's typical of her expectation that he 
help. That he — that he fly Tristen here and there. I 
don't see her doing that same thing or demanding that same 
thing herself. 
Q. And, in fact, you talk about that there was an 
order early on in this case that the parties would 
initially share one half of the cost of the custody 
evaluation. 
Who has, in fact, paid most of the cost of your 
evaluation? 
A. Oh, I would say Mr, Tiller has paid probably 
5/6. 
Q. Okay. What has been your total bill to date? 
A. About 3,000. 
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Q. And how much has Mr. Tiller paid of that? 
A* Oh, about $2,500 or more, 
Q. Okay. Now, are you aware that Mr. Tiller at one 
point had a — aspirations to have a professional boxing 
career? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And are you aware that he's given that up? 
A. I didn't know that he'd given it up. 
Q* Would it — would it make any difference in 
terms of your perception of him and his willingness to 
sacrifice for the benefit of the child if you were aware 
that he had, in a counsel with his current spouse, decided 
that that was an inappropriate lifestyle to raise a family 
and decided to give it up? 
A. Well, I think that's nice. I think that's a ~ 
that's significant. 
Q. Now, do you have — with — with what has 
happened during the time that you've been involved in this 
case — the entire time that you've been working on your 
evaluation, including updating your evaluation in 
preparation for making a recommendation to the Court, are 
you prepared to make a recommendation to the Court 
regard — with regard to permanent placement of this child, 
Tristen? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And what is that recommendation? 
A. I recommend that Tristen stay here. 
Q. By stay — 
A. Which means that he stay with his father. I 
think that if his father were moving to Germany, and his 
mother were staying here, I would want him to stay here. 
Q. Okay. Now, you've already indicated that you 
see the bond between the two as roughly equal? That that 
is essentially the reason for that recommendation? 
A. That, and I really think that right now, because 
his mother is living in Germany, that Tristen would be 
better off in Tim Tiller's home with Maggie being an 
influence, and him being able to associate with his half 
sister and — and his stepbrother and sisters. 
Also he's in a — a real — I think an 
exceptional school system at Bloomington Hills in 
particular, so I'd like to see him stay in that educational 
track that he's in. And I — I was impressed with the 
teacher, in that she knew what she wanted for him. 
THE COURT: Counsel, maybe this is a good time 
to break for lunch. Why don't we go ahead and take our 
noon recess and come back into session in this case at 
3:30. But if you can be here 10 minutes early, it wouldn't 
help — it wouldn't hurt much at all. 
We're in recess. 
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(Whereupon, a lunch recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: All right. We are back on the 
record the 16th of April, 1998, in Tiller versus Tiller. 
The parties are making their way into the courtroom. 
And, Mr, Thamert, you're still on the witness 
stand, so you get to walk the farthest. 
And Mrs. Cummins is here, together with her 
counsel, Mr. Read. 
And, Mr. Westfall, you are still on your direct, 
MR. WESTFALL: Thank you, Your Honor. Just a 
couple more questions. 
Q. Mr. Thamert, with regard to Desiree's visiting 
when she was on the continent of the United States in the 
state of Oklahoma, do you know if she has any relatives 
that live in the area that she could stay with if she came 
out for a visit? 
A. You know, I don't know that. I believe her 
husband's family lives in I want to say LaVerkin or 
Hurricane, but I don't know if she has any relatives 
herself. 
Q. Okay. But do you have some information that 
leads you to believe that her in-laws live in the 
LaVerkin/Hurricane area? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Okay. Now, if — if her husband, John 
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Cummins — if he were able to come — that is, if he could 
get leave so that he could come and be here for the — for 
the trial today, would it cause you any concern that he 
didn't come? 
A. If he could come and chose not to, it would. 
Q. Why? 
A. I think it's important for him to be supportive 
of what his wife is going through — wants to do. 
Q. Now, I'd asked you earlier for your — your 
recommendation, and you had indicated that it was your 
recommendation that — that •— that Tristen stay here. 
My — my next question is if — if you were able 
to — and I realize there are a number of factors that 
you're supposed to look at in terms of determining which 
home would be the better home to place the child. Do you 
have any perception as to the stability of the — the 
respective homes in looking at that factor, where it would 
be in Tristen's best interest to stay — to be? 
A. Well, I — I feel that Mr. Tiller's home is 
quite stable right now, and I — and has been for some 
time. It's not that I don't think Mrs. Cummins' isn't, 
it's that I don't know. And I — it's an unknown. 
I — when I do these home studies, I think about 
my four-year-old grandson, and whether I would want to send 
him to Germany in an unknown situation. And I -— or 
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whether I'd rather have him being taken care of here where 
I feel relatively secure and sure about the circumstances. 
And I — I would rather have him be here. 
MR. WESTFALL: All right. Thank you. That's 
all I have at this time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Read, do you want to ask any 
cross at this point? 
MR. READ: Your Honor, I — I don't believe I 
do. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Thamert. 
You may step down, then. 
Mr. Westfall, do you want to call another 
witness, then? 
MR. WESTFALL: Well, I can. I guess I wanted to 
kind of get a feel from the Court what the Court would like 
us to do. We've talked about rescheduling the trial for 
conclusion on the full day August 3rd, and we cleared that 
with the scheduling clerk. 
THE COURT: If we've got that day, Counsel, 
let's give it more than August 3rd. Let's try to give it 
the next day as well. August 3rd is a Monday. I probably 
ought to try to clear the 4th as well to make sure that 
people are not — I'm — and my concern as we all know is 
Miss Cummins' travel. If she's going to make the effort, 
let's make sure we get it done. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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1 what they've paid. 
2 MR. WESTFALL: Thank you. 
3 THE JUDGE: All right. With respect to 
4 the real issue in this case which is the care, 
5 custody and control of Tristan let me go through 
6 the statutory factors myself. And perhaps this 
7 is the most encouraging thing about this entire 
8 case is the substantial progress that both of 
9 these parties have made with respect to these 
10 issues. 
11 With respect to the moral character and 
12 emotional stability of these parties, back in 
13 1992 when Tristan was conceived neither party was 
14 showing particularly stellar moral character nor 
15 emotional stability. In fact frankly, they were 
16 living chaotic lives going back and forth from one 
17 place to another, from one mate to another, not 
18 adhering to the moral upbringing that either had, 
19 II simply floating out there subject to whatever whim 
20 II may have come across. 
21 || In the more recent past the Court finds 
22 || that Mr. Tiller has a conviction with this court 
23 || for a Class A misdemeanor of writing bad checks. 
24 || Mrs. Cummins has no criminal record that I can 
25 || find. 
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1 Both parties now show substantial 
2 emotional stability. I am encouraged by 
3 Mr. Tiller's present marriage. And frankly, both 
4 parties need to understand that I think that 
5 Maggie and John could do a much better job of 
6 parenting and raising Tristan than the two of you 
7 could just because when you two deal with Tristan 
8 you've got too much baggage. All the anger and 
9 the upset and the misery that you've gone through 
10 one with the other rubs off. Tristan is not a 
11 dumb kid, he's a bright lad and he understands the 
12 misery that each of you have inflicted upon the 
13 other, he was a witness to it. Hopefully you 
14 will both get beyond that as you both grow up and 
15 develop and grow and become better parents and 
16 better humans in the process. I can see that that 
17 is happening for both of you and that is 
18 encouraging. Time does heal a lot and you will 
19 learn throughout the years as you both raise and 
1 
20 parent Tristan in your respective spheres that you 
21 can give him the benefits of all that you have. 
22 And I encourage you to do so. 
23 With respect to the benefit of keeping 
24 siblings together. Tristan does not have any 
25 other siblings so his relationship with 
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1 halfsiblings is going to be evenly based as I see 
2 it. 
3 The relative strength of the child's bond 
4 with one or both of the prospective custodians. 
5 That is evenly based. The parties are evenly 
6 bonded to Tristan and Tristan evenly bonded to his 
7 mother and his dad. Which is probably to 
8 Mr. Tiller's good report because Tristan didn't 
9 have a dad for the first two years of his life. 
10 Until Mr. Tiller took the responsibility and built 
11 up that bond there wasn't one and so that shows a 
12 very positive thing on Mr. Tiller's part. 
13 With respect to duration and depth of 
14 desire for custody I find that the parties are 
15 evenly matched there. Both sides show a deep and 
16 continuing desire for custody of Tristan. 
17 The ability to provide personal rather 
18 than surrogate care. The evidence is unrebutted 
19 that Mr. Tiller's schedule with the bail bonding 
20 company has made it so that he can spend the time 
21 with Tristan and the evidence is clearly 
22 unrebutted that Mrs. Cummins will be a stay at 
23 home mom with the new baby and would be able to be 
24 a stay at home mom with Tristan. 
25 There is no significant impairment on 
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1 either party through drug abuse, excessive 
2 drinking or other causes that would interfere with 
3 their ability to be a good parent so long as they 
4 are willing to shed the resentment and the 
5 hostility and the attitudes that have grown up 
6 over this custody fight. 
7 The reasons for having relinquished 
8 custody in the past. I find no harm to either 
9 party's position for relinquishing custody in the 
10 past. Mrs. Cummins relinquished custody last 
11 summer based upon a very favorable recommendation 
12 in a home study report. And Mr. Tiller 
13 relinquished custody only to the extent that he 
14 had agreed to do so in resolving the initial 
15 decree of divorce in this case. So neither party 
16 suffers from that. 
17 Religious compatibility with the child is 
18 present in both homes. That's not an issue. 
19 Kinship. I'm glad that the grandparents 
20 are here. Grandmas need to understand that if 
21 these two parents work as they should and could 
22 for Tristan's well-being that Tristan will have a 
23 whole spectrum of grandparents who can appreciate 
24 and encourage and support and love him. You can 
25 bring the best of all worlds if you will go to the 
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1 effort and support the fact that this lady here 
2 and this lady here both are grandmas. And 
3 Tristan, like Mr. Thamert told me, is a delightful 
4 young man. That means that the breeding has 
5 proved true. You've got to come from pretty good 
6 grandmas to get a good young man like that. And 
7 everybody think positive rather than negative. 
8 Now, financial condition. Both parties 
9 have the financial abilities and resources to 
10 raise Tristan reasonably. He's not going to have 
11 excesses in his life but he'll be taken care of. 
12 Both parties have that ability. 
13 Item number nine is of the most concern 
14 to the Court. The Court finds by compelling 
15 evidence that Tristan and his mother were 
16 subjected to abuse at the hands of Mr. Tiller. I 
17 am persuaded by the clarity of the testimony from 
18 Mrs. Cummins relation of the events as well as the 
19 filing of the protective order in close proximity 
20 to those events in May of 1995 that there was 
21 evidence of abuse. 
22 It is not abuse that would ever happen 
23 again. That's the kind of progress that these 
24 parties have made. I am certain and convinced as 
25 of today's date that Mr. Tiller would never raise 
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1 his hand to this child in that fashion ever 
2 again. He is a different man now than he was 
3 back then. Just as I am convinced that 
4 Mrs. Cummins would never fall asleep while Tristan 
5 was wandering around the pool. That wouldn't 
6 happen again either. 
7 l In reviewing all of these factors the 
8 Court finds that it is in the best interest of 
9 Tristan that care, custody and control be ordered 
10 to his mother. And that visitation while Tristan 
11 is in Germany will be nine weeks in the summer 
12 months. And those nine weeks in the summer 
13 months will be as soon as he's released from 
14 school, then he'll come here to Utah to live with 
15 his dad and his sister and his other sister and 
16 brother. 
17 Visitation, however, and the custody 
18 arrangements themselves will be subject to 
19 adjustment by motion and not by petition once 
20 Tristan is no longer living in Germany with his 
21 mother. And the record should be clear my 
22 purposes in doing this. I believe that it is in 
23 Tristan's best interest that he be given the 
24 opportunity to travel, that he be given the chance 
25 to go with his mother to Europe and to see that 
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1 part of the world. Even as a young lad that he 
2 will be able to grow. But as he gets older and 
3 as his father grows and those circumstances change 
4 and alter then the visitation schedule plus 
5 Tristan's school schedule may accommodate 
6 differing times of visitation. If Tristan goes to 
7 a place where he's going to have year-round school 
8 then nine weeks in the summer isn't going to make 
9 much sense but off-track periods can be done and 
10 moved. 
11 Because I find these parties so closing 
12 balanced in their ability to be good parents that 
13 I do not want to have anything interfere with 
14 Tristan's understanding of the man that his father 
15 is and the fact that his father is growing and 
16 getting to be a better man every day, just like 
17 his mother is growing to get to be a better mom 
18 every day. So I am going to subject the 
19 visitation arrangements to simple motion rather 
20 than petition for change in circumstances because 
21 of that change and that alteration. 
22 With respect to child support, I have 
23 Mr. Tiller's net income of $1,800 a month. I am 
24 projecting from that that his gross income is 
25 $2,250 per month. Mrs. Tiller's, or 
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1 Mrs. Cummins' income is at the rate of $6.50 cents 
2 per hour for a 40 hour work week, 4.3 weeks per 
3 month. Support will be arranged on that basis. 
4 However, Mr. Tiller is allowed and given 
5 an immediate credit against support obligations in 
6 the amount of $1,920 for an arrearage that has 
I 
7 built up and is part of the record now. So the 
8 support obligation will be reduced by that amount 
9 and I will give it to Mr. Tiller to simply take a 
10 recess in support obligations until that's used 
11 up. And if he wishes because of Ms. Cummins' 
12 inability to produce income right now he may also 
13 credit against the support obligation the daycare 
14 liability as well as the medical expense liability 
15 against that support obligation. 
I 
16 That would also enable Mr. Tiller to 
17 conduct the ongoing phone arrangements. The 
18 phone arrangements shall continue as the parties 
19 have done them in the past, Wednesdays and 
2 0 Sundays. 
21 Mr. Read, if you will prepare Findings of 
22 Fact, Conclusions of Law and a final Order. 
23 Do I need to clarify anything from your 
24 standpoint, Counsel? 
25 MR|. READ: No, Your Honor. 
I 
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1 THE JUDGE: Mr. Westfall, do I need to 
2 clarify any point from your standpoint? 
3 MR. WESTFALL: Yes, Your Honor. We'd 
4 like to know what, when Desiree is planning to 
5 leave and what would happen to Tristan in the 
6 meantime. We'd also like to know if Mr. Tiller 
7 is going to be afforded an opportunity, assuming 
8 that he can afford it, to have Tristan come and 
9 visit either Thanksgiving or Christmas or some 
10 other time during the year when he has a break 
11 from school if it's more than a couple of days. 
12 THE JUDGE: If Mr. Tiller, if Mr. Tiller 
13 can afford to he may bring Tristan here. Or if 
14 Mr. Tiller wishes to visit Tristan in Europe I 
15 have no objection to a visitation of one week over 
16 the Christmas holidays or one week over the Easter 
17 holiday as Tristan's school schedule would 
18 allow. 
19 The potential for Tristan and his dad to 
20 see Europe together, parts of Europe that John and 
21 Desiree may not be able to because John's military 
22 requirements might not let him go, but if Tristan 
23 and his dad could go that might be a very 
24 favorable thing for Tristan. 
25 MR. WESTFALL: So one week during, over 
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1 recommendation by Mr. Thamert was that the parties 
2 retain joint legal custody. With the, with the 
3 parenting schedule being changed am I to 
4 understand that that's what the Court has done or 
5 has the Court changed the legal custody order? 
6 THE JUDGE: I have changed legal 
7 custody, Counsel. Care, custody and control is 
8 vested in Mrs. Cummins at this time. 
9 Now, Mr. Tiller and Mrs. Cummins, through 
10 no choice of your own and certainly not through 
11 any choice of mine I am part of Tristan's life. 
12 It's expensive to come back and ask me to 
13 intervene in Tristan's life. Encourage your 
14 families and each other and work within yourselves 
15 to accommodate the needs of the parties. 
16 Accommodate those needs. 
17 Let me give you an idea of how to do 
18 it. Mrs. Cummins, Father's Day next year you and 
19 Tristan ought to go to the BX or even into town 
20 and find a good Father's Day present that you'll 
21 pay for and Tristan will sign the card and draw a 
22 picture and send it to his dad because that's good 
23 for Tristan. You might not want to give a gift 
24 to Mr. Tiller but Tristan will and it's good for 
25 him. And on similar occasions the same operation 
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1 the Christmas holiday and one week at Easter. Is 
2 that what the Court's indicating? 
3 THE JUDGE: Yes, Counsel. Include 
4 that. 
5 MR. WESTFALL: That's in addition to 
6 the nine weeks during the summertime? 
7 THE JUDGE: That's correct, Counsel. 
8 MR. WESTFALL: And then with reference to 
9 when--
10 THE JUDGE: I would like Tristan to be 
11 prepared to go with his mother at 9:00 o'clock 
12 tomorrow morning because Mrs. Cummins has to get 
13 on the airplane before the 18th which is a week 
14 from tomorrow. 
15 Anything else, Mr. Read? 
16 MR. READ: Your Honor, no. There's 
17 just some records that Ms. Cummins indicates 
18 she'll need like school records and medical and 
19 dental for the time period here and I don't 
20 foresee any probLem getting them. 
21 THE JUDGE: Mrs. Cummins has that 
22 [I authority as Tristan's mom. All right. 
23 || MR. WESTFALL: Your Honor? 
24 || THE JUDGE: Yes, Counsel. 
25 || MR. WESTFALL: The initial, initial 
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1 goes. 
2 This little boy has suffered enough chaos 
3 in his life, it's time to get it settled down and 
4 treatment him with the respect and dignity that 
5 he's entitled to. And when you start doing that 
6 then all the misery and the grief and the 
7 unhappiness that's gone between the two of you 
8 will quickly fade away and Tristan will be the 
9 better child for it. 
10 Thank you, Counsel. Court stands 
11 adj ourned. 
12 WHEREUPON, the trial was concluded. 
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